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 3 
Introduction 
 
The past 20 years have witnessed a massive transformation of professional sports 
infrastructure in the North America and the rest of the world. In the United States and 
Canada alone, by 2012, 125 of the 140 teams in the five largest professional sports 
leagues, the National Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National 
Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Soccer (MLS), and National Hockey 
League (NHL), will play in stadiums constructed or significantly refurbished since 1990. 
This new construction has come at a significant cost, the majority of which has been 
borne by taxpayers. Construction costs alone for major league professional sports 
facilities have totaled in excess of $30 billion in nominal terms over the past two decades 
with over half of the cost being paid by the public. See Tables 1 through 5 for lists of 
newly constructed or refurbished stadiums in various American sports leagues. It should 
be noted that these figures understate the total level of public subsidies directed towards 
spectator sports, as they exclude subsidies not directly related to infrastructure and also 
ignore minor league and collegiate sports as well as other popular professional sports 
such as golf, tennis, or auto racing.  
 North America is not alone in its largesse directed to sports facilities. South 
Africa spent $1.3 billion on building and upgrading 10 soccer stadiums for the 2010 
World Cup following on the heels of Germany‟s 2.4 billion euro investment in stadiums 
and general infrastructure for the 2006 edition of the event. The Summer Olympic Games 
require the greatest financial commitment of all the mega-sports events with the typical 
outlay in the neighborhood of $10 billion, but in some instances the sums have far 
surpassed that amount (Preuss, 2004).  China reportedly incurred costs in excess of $58 
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billion to host the event in 2008 (Upegui, 2008).  Such sums of direct public investment 
to build infrastructure for private businesses or events are generally rare in other sectors 
of the economy. For this level of public investment, it is reasonable to ask the extent to 
which professional sports serve to promote local economic development. 
 
Professional Sports as a Mirror of Economic Development 
Organized sports are as old as history itself.  Typically, however, the construction 
of sports stadiums and the creation of professional sports franchises have served as a 
reflection of economic development rather than a means to it.  The grandeur of the 
Roman Colosseum is a clear testament to the wealth and engineering skills of the Roman 
Empire, but it was certainly not designed to enhance local incomes.  Roman poet Juvenal 
coined the phrase “bread and circuses” in circa 100 A.D. to describe the use of food 
subsidies and lavish entertainment to distract and pacify the masses.  This term has come 
to symbolize the decline of civic duty in the Roman Empire in favor of frivolity and 
shallow desires. According to Juvenal, Roman politicians decided that the most effective 
way to ascend to power was to buy the votes of the poor by giving out cheap food and 
entertainment, i.e. bread and circuses (Sperber, 2001). Under the Roman emperors, the 
Colosseum was simply another way, albeit a costly one, to limit public dissent. There is 
no evidence that it was expected to promote local economic growth.  
Rome was not alone in its pursuit of spectator sports. Ball games were played in 
ancient Egypt, the Greeks created the now famous Olympic Games in 776 B.C., and 
Native Americans played handball in the Mayan empire and the forerunner of lacrosse in 
what is now the northeastern portion of the United States.  Although many ancient sports 
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such as archery, chariot racing, horseback riding, and wrestling can be seen as offshoots 
of professional military training, typically participants would have been considered 
amateur athletes. While contestants in these games may have been rewarded by 
government, religious leaders, or the spectators themselves for superior athletic 
performance, the rise of the truly professional athlete did not come about until the late 
1800s (Matheson, 2006).  
The first sport in the U.S. to give rise to fully professional athletes was baseball. 
Following the codification of the rules by Alexander Cartwright in 1845, baseball grew in 
popularity both as a spectator and participatory sport. While some players on particular 
teams received compensation for their play, it was not until 1869 that the Cincinnati Red 
Stockings formed the first team comprised entirely of professional players. Their success 
on the field led other teams to adopt their strategy. By 1871, the National Association 
was formed with 9 teams, including the Boston Braves, the forerunner of today‟s modern 
Atlanta Braves. 
Not surprisingly, the rise of the professional athlete occurred during the time of 
the industrial revolution, which provided substantial increases in income for the average 
worker.  As the country grew wealthier, spectator sports rose in popularity, as people 
both had both higher incomes to pay for these activities and an increased availability of 
leisure time. In addition, improvements in transportation allowed for the formation of 
intercity sports leagues. 
 Early stadium construction in the U.S. reflected the economic landscape. Playing 
facilities were located in the major population centers in the east. They offered few amenities 
compared to modern stadiums, reflecting the lower income of the fan base and the concentration 
of population and economic power in the Midwest and Northeast. For fifty years between 1903 
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and 1953, all 16 teams in Major League Baseball were located east of St. Louis and north of St. 
Louis and Washington, D.C.  Similarly, except for a single season by a Los Angeles club, all 56 
teams that played at least one season in the National Football League between its founding in 
1920 and 1945 were located in the industrial Midwest or the Northeast corridor. 
 Large stadiums, or course, were constructed during the early 20
th
 century to 
accommodate the growing number of fans of baseball, football, and other sports. While the 
franchises that these old stadiums served still exist to this day, most succumbed to physical and 
economic obsolescence.  Fans of the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs, however, can watch 
their home games in the last two remaining professional baseball facilities from that era, Fenway 
Park and Wrigley Field, built in 1912 and 1914, respectively. In addition, several college football 
stadiums from that time period are also still in current use, including Harvard Stadium (1903), 
Yale Bowl (1914), Rose Bowl (1922), and Los Angeles Coliseum (1923).  
 The relocation and expansion of sports leagues into the southern and western United 
States reflects the growing importance of these regions in the overall American economy. After 
half a century of stability, in the 1950s MLB franchises relocated from major cities on the east 
coast to destinations far distant from the old centers of economic influence – the Philadelphia A‟s 
moved to Kansas City and then Oakland, the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants headed 
west to Los Angeles and San Francisco, respectively, the Boston Braves went to Milwaukee and 
then south to Atlanta.  Similarly, league expansion in the 1960s and 1970s created franchises in 
areas that had experienced rapid economic growth over the past half century, such as Southern 
California, Seattle, and Texas. The most recent wave of expansion in the 1990s brought new 
teams into the fast-growing Sunbelt regions of Florida and Arizona. Just as efficient railroad 
service allowed for travel between cities in the East, the advent of widespread passenger air 
service allowed for the development of truly nationwide sport leagues. Although this discussion 
has concentrated on the history of professional baseball, similar patterns of relocation and 
expansion can be observed in all of the other major sports. Again, stadium construction and 
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franchise relocation reflected economic development in the country rather than the other 
way around.   
Baade (2010) noted that geographic considerations were not the only factor in the 
construction of new sports facilities.  Economy-wide fluctuations during the last century clearly 
influenced sports facility construction. Except for Yankee Stadium in New York and Soldier 
Field in Chicago, virtually no new stadiums were constructed between World War I and 1946, a 
time dominated by the Great Depression and World War II.  The pace of stadium construction 
accelerated from the 1950s through the mid-1970s, as growing prosperity and technological 
development enabled the construction of steel-and-concrete playing facilities during the ten years 
from 1965 through 1975, replacing many existing facilities.  
Sports remain a very clear indicator of economic development to this day. Studies 
investigating national success at international sporting events such as the Olympics and World 
Cup suggest that economic factors play clear roles. For example, Bernard and Busse (2004) find 
that all other things equal, a 1% increase in GDP per capita compared to the world average will 
increase the number of Olympic medals won by roughly the same amount. Similar results are 
found in other sports, for example, men‟s and women‟s international football (Hoffmann, Lee and 
Ramasamy, 2002; Hoffmann, et al., 2006). In all cases, higher income is presumed to affect 
sporting success by providing athletes with better sports infrastructure, better access to 
specialized training, and more leisure time to pursue their athletic endeavors. 
For individual professional teams local market income is also an important factor in 
predicting both franchise location and team success. For professional leagues without significant 
limitations on team payrolls, such as Major League Baseball and most European soccer leagues, 
successful teams tend to be located in large metropolitan areas with high incomes. It comes as no 
surprise that MLB‟s New York Yankees, who reside in the country‟s largest and richest 
metropolitan area, have an unprecedented record of success over the past century. Similarly, 
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English Premier League teams Arsenal and Chelsea, both of which call London home, are 
perennial contenders for their league‟s title. Wealthy, populous hometowns provide teams with a 
large potential revenue stream necessary for purchasing talented players. 
 While local economic development is clearly a factor in both the emergence of 
professional sports as well as sports success, from a public policy standpoint it is 
important to ask whether the reverse is also true. Does a healthy spectator sports 
environment lead to local economic development, or is it simply a byproduct of normal 
economic development?  The answer to such a question provides guidance on whether 
public subsidies for professional sports facilities are a wise investment. This question will 
be examined in the next section. 
 
Economic Development Effects of Sports Leagues, Teams, and Events 
If one believes the boosters, sports teams and so-called “mega-events” bring a 
substantial economic windfall to host cities. Promoters envision hoards of wealthy sports 
fans descending on a city‟s hotels, restaurants, and businesses, and injecting large sums 
of money into the cities lucky enough to host these teams and events. In terms of one-off 
events, for example, the NFL typically claims an economic impact from the Super Bowl 
of around $400 to $500 million (NFL, 1999; W.P Carey Business School, 2008), and 
Major League Baseball (MLB) attaches a $75 million benefit to the All-Star Game (Selig, 
et al., 1999) and up $250 million for the World Series (Ackman, 2000). Multi-day events 
such as the Summer or Winter Olympics or soccer‟s World Cup produce even larger 
numbers. For example, consultants placed a $12 billion figure on the 2010 World Cup in 
South Africa (Voigt, 2010) and estimated an economic impact of over $10 billion 
Canadian for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver (InterVISTAS Consulting, 2002). 
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See Table 6 for a list of published ex ante economic impact estimates for a variety of 
large sporting events.  
Regular season games and year-round franchises also prompt eye-popping 
estimates of potential benefits. The St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association 
estimated that the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team brought $301 million in annual 
economic benefits to the region on top of another potential $40 to $48 million in gains 
from a post-season appearance (St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association, 
2000). The New Orleans Saints of the NFL generated an estimated $402 million impact 
on the state of Louisiana in 2002 (Ryan, 2003) while the NBA‟s Seattle Supersonics 
claimed that they pumped $234 million into the area‟s economy annually prior to their 
move to Oklahoma City (Feit, 2006).  
 Of course, as noted by Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), “leagues, team 
owners, and event organizers have a strong incentive to provide economic impact 
numbers that are as large as possible in order to justify heavy public subsidies.” Sports 
leagues frequently utilize rosy economic impact statements and dangle mega-events such 
as the Super Bowl and baseball‟s All-Star Game in front of cities in order to encourage 
otherwise reluctant city officials and taxpayers to provide significant public funding for 
new stadiums to the benefit of existing owners.  
 Unfortunately, the methodology used to formulate estimates of economic impact 
is fatally flawed, resulting in a consistent bias toward large, but unrealized, impacts. 
Economic impact predictions are done in a reasonably straight-forward fashion. In the 
case of either an event or a franchise, the total number of visitors to the event or the team 
is estimated along with an average level of spending for each sports fan. The number of 
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fans multiplied by the average spending results in an estimate of direct economic impact. 
Once the direct economic impact is determined, a multiplier is applied, which accounts 
for money re-circulating in the local economy. For most sports-related spending a 
multiplier around two is used, roughly doubling the direct economic impact.  
Although this methodology is easy to understand, typically researchers point to 
three primary flaws in most economic impact studies. The first common error is the 
failure to account for the substitution effect. While it is undeniable that sports fans around 
the country and around the world spend significant sums on spectator sports, in the 
absence of such entertainment opportunities, their spending would be directed elsewhere 
in the economy.  A night at the ballpark means more money in the players‟ and team 
owner‟s pockets, but it also means less money in the pockets of local theater or restaurant 
owners. Most economists not associated with teams or event organizers advocate that any 
spending by local residents on local sporting events be eliminated from economic impact 
analyses. 
The next common criticism is crowding out. The crowds and congestion 
associated with major sporting events tend to reduce other economic activity in the local 
area, as sports fans displace other individuals. As with the substitution effect, sports tend 
to affect the allocation of economic activity across businesses and different sectors of the 
economy but not the total amount of activity that occurs. As a case in point, while 
Olympic visitors flocked to Beijing for the 2008 Summer Games, other visitors stayed 
away in droves. The number of tourist arrivals to the city in August 2008, the month of 
the Games, was the same as the number of visitors the previous year and total visitor 
arrivals for the entire year was significantly lower than the previous year. Crowding out 
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effects are clearly visible for major sporting events held in Hawaii as well. An analysis of 
flight arrival data by Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi (2009) shows that sporting events 
like the Honolulu Marathon and NFL Pro-Bowl, both of which attract tens of thousands 
participants and spectators, lead to only small increases in the total number of tourists to 
the islands as the athletes and fans displace other vacationers.  
Finally, money spent in local economies during either regular season games or 
special events may not stay in the local economy. The nature of professional sports is that 
the athletes generally command as wages a large share of revenues generated by sporting 
events. However, the athletes themselves are typically unlikely to live in the metropolitan 
area in which they play. (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2002). Therefore, the income earned by 
athletes is not likely to re-circulate in the local economy, leading to a lower multiplier 
effect. In the extreme, spending at a sporting event could actually reduce local incomes, 
as money is diverted from an activity with a high multiplier, for example a dinner at a 
locally owned and operated restaurant, towards sports, an activity with high leakages.  
Researchers who have gone back and looked at economic data for localities that 
have hosted mega-events, attracted new franchises, or built new sports facilities have 
almost invariably found little or no economic benefits from spectator sports. Typically, ex 
post studies of the economic impact of sports have focused on employment (Baade and 
Matheson, 2002; Feddersen and Maennig, 2009), personal income (Baade and Matheson, 
2006a), personal income per capita (Coates and Humphreys, 1999; 2002), taxable sales 
(Porter, 1999;  Coates and Depken, 2009; Baumann, Baade, and Matheson, 2008), or 
tourist arrivals (Lavoie and Rodriguez, 2005; Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi, 2009). 
These studies and a multitude of others generally find that the actual economic impact of 
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sports teams or events is a fraction of that claimed by the boosters, and in some cases 
actually show a reduction in economic activity due to sports. See Table 7 for a list of 
published ex post economic impact estimates for a variety of large sporting events.  
Even if the immediate direct economic impact of spectator sports is negligible, 
proponents of sports-based economic development suggest that the long-term effects may 
be large. Mega-events “put cities on the map,” and new stadiums can serve as anchors in 
dilapidated areas to promote local growth. Here too, however, the data are not 
convincing. While tourists may flock to host cities during major sporting events, the 
surge in visitors tends to be short-lived. As noted by Matheson (2009), “in Sydney, the 
host of the 2000 Summer Olympics, foreign tourism actually grew at a slower rate than in 
the rest of the Australia in the three years following the Games. Lillehammer, Norway, 
the site of the 1994 Winter Olympics experienced a wave of bankruptcies in the years 
following their moment in the spotlight, as 40% of the full-service hotels in the town 
went bankrupt.” 
At least in part, a portion of the blame for the poor, long-term benefits of 
spectator sports is the fact that the capital used in staging sporting contests is not easily 
convertible to other uses. While the construction of general infrastructure, such as 
modern airports, highways, and mass transit systems, provides economy-wide benefits, 
such architectural and technological marvels as Beijing‟s “Water Cube,” the 17,000 seat 
state-of-the-art swimming facility built for the 2008 Summer Olympics, has little use 
following the Games. The facility is now open to the general public for free swimming, 
making it the world‟s most expensive lap pool. Similarly, in South Korea most of the new 
stadiums built for the 2002 World Cup sit unused today.  
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Giesecke and Madden (2007) have quantified the effects of infrastructure 
spending in Sydney for the 2000 Summer Olympics and have concluded that the 
“redirection of public money into relatively unproductive infrastructure, such as 
equestrian centers and man-made rapids, has since cut A$2.1 billion from public 
consumption.” 
While the long-run benefits of sporting events and stadium construction may 
never arrive, the debts that localities incur in hosting professional sports must still be 
paid. Montreal was still paying off its debts from the 1976 Olympics three decades later,  
and the Astrodome in Houston still carried millions of dollars of debt despite being 
vacant for a nearly a decade.  
Perhaps the most tragic tale is that of Greece, which suffered massive financial 
setbacks in 2010. Greece's federal government had historically been a profligate spender, 
but in order to join the euro currency zone, the government was forced to adopt austerity 
measures that reduced deficits from just over 9% of GDP in 1994 to just 3.1% of GDP in 
1999, the year before Greece joined the euro. But the Olympics hosted by Athens broke 
the bank. Government deficits rose every year after 1999, peaking at 7.5% of GDP in 
2004, the year of the Olympics, thanks in large part to the 9 billion euro price tag for the 
Games. For a relatively small country like Greece, the cost of hosting the Games equaled 
roughly 5% of the annual GDP of the country.  
Unfortunately, as has been seen in other cases, the Olympics didn't usher in an 
economic boom. Indeed, in 2005 Greece suffered an Olympic-sized hangover with GDP 
growth falling to its lowest level in a decade. While it‟s hard to place all of the blame for 
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the 2010 Greek meltdown on the Olympics, the lingering debts from the Games 
undoubtedly exacerbated an already difficult situation. 
Even if commercial sport does induce an increase in economic activity, the 
efficacy of sport as a developmental tool needs to be considered.  The litmus test 
arguably should not be whether sport induces an increase in economic activity, but rather 
is it the most efficient method for improving the economy.  Focusing on employment, 
Baade and Sanderson (1997) observed that the cost of creating a full-time equivalent job 
through sports subsidies far exceeds the cost of job creation through other subsidies.  
More specifically, it was noted that the cost of job creation through sports is far greater 
than jobs created through the Public Works Capital Development and Investment Acts of 
the 1970s or Alabama‟s much maligned subsidies to convince Mercedes-Benz AG to 
locate some of their manufacturing in that State.  It is also important to note that as many 
as 98 percent of the jobs created through sports subsidies are in the relatively low-paying, 
non-manufacturing sector. 
Numerous funding mechanisms have been used by local authorities for funding 
stadium construction. Table 8 shows the funding mechanisms for NFL stadiums built 
between 1992 and 2006. While a variety of revenue sources are used for football stadium 
construction, three types are most common:  personal seat licenses (PSLs), excise taxes 
on hotels or rental cars, and general funds including sales taxes.  
Personal seat licenses (PSLs) involve a payment by a prospective season ticket 
buyer to the stadium builder in exchange for the purchaser gaining the right to buy a seat 
ticket in the new stadium. Personal seat licenses are a source of public works revenue 
unique to the sporting world, and they serve several purposes. First, they turn consumers‟ 
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future willingness to pay for tickets into an immediate source of capital that can be used 
to defray current construction costs. Second, they allow teams to avoid revenue sharing 
agreements with the rest of the league. In the NFL, teams are required to share 40% of 
gate revenues with visiting teams while other revenue sources, such as PSLs, are not 
subject to the revenue sharing arrangement. All things equal, PSLs should raise non-
shared revenue and lower ticket prices reducing overall revenue sharing payments to the 
rest of the league. The other major sports leagues in the U.S. have lower revenue sharing 
percentages, and therefore PSLs are much less common in other sports. Finally, PSLs 
satisfy the “user pays” principle of public finance. A stadium financed by PSLs is a 
stadium that is financed by the very people who will be using the stadium and benefitting 
from the new team the stadium is designed to attract or from the enhanced amenities that 
new stadiums provide.   
Other funding mechanisms used to finance events and stadium construction, 
however, more often violate commonly held principals of public finance. Taxes on rental 
cars, hotels, and central-city restaurants, the second common tool used to repay stadium 
bond issues, while seemingly shifting the expense of the stadium to out-of-town visitors, 
in fact, simply make those revenue sources unavailable for use elsewhere in the city. 
Furthermore, only a tiny fraction of the hotel rooms or rental cars used in a city over the 
course of a year are purchased by visitors engaging in sports tourism. Thus, restaurant 
goers, for example, may serve to simply subsidize better seating for football fans.  
The use of general sales taxes or lottery proceeds, the third common source of 
funding for sports infrastructure, violates most people‟s notions of vertical equity by 
placing an undue burden on poorer residents. Both revenue sources are strongly 
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regressive while the benefits provided by subsidized stadium construction accrue 
primarily to the wealthy. Live attendance at major sporting events is dominated by 
wealthy individuals, and the revenue generated by sporting events for the most part ends 
up in the pockets of millionaire players and billionaire owners.  
Even tax increment financing or ticket taxes or surcharges are not without their 
critics, as few other businesses are allowed to use taxes collected on their customers to 
pay for their own capital expenditures (Baade and Matheson, 2006b).  
 
The Final Justification:  Quality of Life 
 If sports teams and events bring little in the way of direct economic benefits, do 
potential indirect benefits exist? Here the evidence is much more favorable to athletic 
supporters. Clearly sports are an entertainment option favored by many. Although the 
professional sports industry in the United States is only roughly the same size as the 
cardboard box industry, cardboard boxes don‟t warrant multiple channels on cable 
television, have a dedicated section in most newspapers, and are not the focus of frequent 
discussions around the office water cooler. Sports serve as a municipal amenity that can 
create social capital and improve the quality of life.  
 Obviously, estimating a more esoteric measure such as societal well-being is more 
difficult than analyzing more concrete data such as employment or government revenues. 
Still, the data hint at clear quality of life benefits from sports. For example, the 2008 
Olympics instilled a sense of pride in the Chinese people.  Some 93% of the Chinese 
citizens surveyed by the Pew Research Center thought that the Games would improve the 
country‟s image (Matheson, 2009). Similarly, Maennig‟s (2007) ex-post analysis of the 
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2006 World Cup in Germany concludes that claims of „„increased turnover in the retail 
trade, overnight accommodation, receipts from tourism and effects on employment [are] 
mostly of little value and may even be incorrect. Of more significance, however, are 
other (measurable) effects such as the novelty effect of the stadiums, the improved image 
for Germany and the feelgood effect for the population‟‟ (Maennig, 2007, p. 1). 
 Numerous scholars, starting with Carlino and Coulsen (2004), have used hedonic- 
pricing techniques to attempt to quantify the quality of life aspects of sports. If the 
presence of an NFL franchise, for example, is a vital cultural amenity for residents in the 
area then the value of the franchise to local citizens should be reflected in a higher 
willingness to pay for living in a city with a team.  Carlino and Coulsen (2006), for 
example, find that rental housing in cities with NFL franchises command 8% higher rents 
than units in other metropolitan areas after correcting for housing characteristics. Others 
such as Feng and Humphreys (2008) and Tu (1995) find localized effects of stadiums and 
arenas on housing prices but also that these effects fade quite quickly as the distance from 
the stadium grows. Conversely, Coates, Humphreys, and Zimbalist (2006) find that 
Carlino and Coulsen‟s results are highly dependent on model specification.  Kiel, 
Matheson and Sullivan (2010) find that the increase in housing costs does not extend to 
owner-occupied housing and also find that the presence of stadium subsidies lowers 
housing values, a finding also uncovered by Dehring, Depken, and Ward (2007).  
 Other researchers have employed contingent-valuation methods to attempt to 
determine the “feel-good” effect that residents derive from spectator sports. While the 
existence of positive benefits from sports teams and events are more commonly identified 
in the contingent valuation literature than in the ex post examination of direct economic 
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impact, here too the assessed value of sports tends to be smaller than the public subsidies 
that are handed out to professional sports (Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001). 
 Improving citizens‟ quality of life is clearly an important goal for public policy 
makers, and there is evidence that sports are a valued amenity for local communities. 
Evidence of significant direct economic benefits from sporting events, franchises, and 
stadiums is lacking, however. While public-private partnerships can be justified on 
quality of life grounds, voters and public officials should not be deluded by over-
optimistic predictions of a financial windfall. Sports may make a city happy, but they are 
unlikely to make a city rich. 
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Table 1:  New NFL Stadiums since 1990 
Team Stadium Built 
Cost  (000s) 
(Nominal) 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Percent 
New Orleans Superdome (repair and rehab) 2011  $    505   $   490 97% 
Giants/Jets New Meadowlands Stadium 2010  $ 1,600   $        -  0% 
Kansas City Arrowhead Stadium (rehab) 2010  $    375   $   250 67% 
Dallas Cowboys Stadium 2009  $ 1,150   $   325 28% 
Indianapolis Lukas Oil Stadium 2008  $    720   $   720 100% 
Arizona University of Phoenix Stadium 2006  $      71   $   267 72% 
Philadelphia Lincoln Financial Field 2003  $    285   $   228 80% 
Green Bay Lambeau Field 2003  $    295   $   251 85% 
Chicago Soldier Field 2003  $    600   $   450 75% 
New England Gillette Stadium 2002  $    325   $     33 10% 
Houston Reliant Stadium 2002  $    300   $   225 75% 
Detroit Ford Field 2002  $    300   $   219 73% 
Seattle Qwest Field 2002  $    300   $   201 67% 
Pittsburgh Heinz Field 2001  $    230   $   150 65% 
Denver Invesco Field 2001  $    365   $   274 75% 
Cincinnati Paul Brown Stadium 2000  $    400   $   400 100% 
Cleveland Browns Stadium 1999  $    283   $   255 90% 
Tennessee LP Field 1999  $    290   $   220 76% 
Buffalo Ralph Wilson Stadium (rehab) 1999  $      63   $     63 100% 
Baltimore M&T Bank Stadium 1998  $    220   $   176 80% 
Tampa Bay Raymond James Stadium 1998  $    169   $   169 100% 
San Diego Qualcomm Stadium 1997  $      78   $     78 100% 
Washington FedEx Field 1997  $    250   $     70 28% 
Oakland Oakland Coliseum (rehab) 1996  $    200   $   200 100% 
Carolina Bank of America Stadium 1996  $    248   $     52 21% 
Jacksonville Everbank Field 1995  $    121   $   121 100% 
St. Louis Edward Jones Dome 1995  $    280   $   280 100% 
Atlanta Georgia Dome 1992  $    214   $   214 100% 
 29 of 32 teams  $10,537  $6,380 61% 
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Table 2: New MLB Stadiums since 1990 
 
Team Stadium Built Cost (000s) 
(Nominal) 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Percent 
Miami Marlins Field 2012  $     525   $    370  70% 
Minnesota Target Field 2010  $     544   $    392  72% 
NY Mets Citi Field 2009  $     600   $    164  27% 
NY Yankees Yankees Stadium 2009  $  1,300   $    220  17% 
Kansas City Kaufmann Stadium (rehab) 2009  $     250   $    175  70% 
Washington Nationals Park 2008  $     611   $    611  100% 
Cardinals Busch Stadium 2006  $     365   $      45  12% 
San Diego PETCO Park 2004  $     457   $    304  66% 
Philadelphia Citizens Bank Park 2004  $     346   $    174  50% 
Cincinnati  Great American Ball Park 2003  $     325   $    280  86% 
Pittsburgh PNC Park 2001  $     262   $    262  100% 
Milwaukee Miller Park 2001  $     400   $    310  78% 
Detroit Comerica Park 2000  $     300   $    115  38% 
Houston Minute Maid Park 2000  $     265   $    180  68% 
San Francisco AT&T Park 2000  $     357   $      15  4% 
Seattle Safeco Park 1999  $     518   $    392  76% 
Arizona Chase Field 1998  $     349   $    238  68% 
Los Angeles Angels Angel Stadium (rehab) 1998  $     118   $      30  25% 
Tampa Bay Tropicana Field 1997  $     208   $    208  100% 
Atlanta Turner Field 1997  $     235   $    165  70% 
Oakland A's Oakland Coliseum (rehab) 1996  $     200   $    200  100% 
Denver Coors Field 1995  $     215   $    168  78% 
Cleveland Progressive Field 1994  $     175   $      91  52% 
Texas Rangers Ballpark at Arlington 1994  $     191   $    135  71% 
Baltimore Camden Yards 1992  $     110   $    100  91% 
Chicago White Sox U.S. Cellular Field 1991  $     167   $    167  100% 
 26 of 30 teams   $  9,393   $ 5,511  59% 
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Table 3:  New MLS Stadiums since 1990 
 
Team Stadium Built Cost (000s) 
(Nominal) 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Percent 
Houston Dynamo Stadium 2012  $    110   $     50  45% 
San Jose Earthquakes Stadium 2012  $      60   $       0  0% 
Kansas City Wizards Stadium 2011  $    160   $     80  50% 
Portland PGE Park (rehab) 2011  $      31   $     31  100% 
Vancouver BC Place Stadium 2011  $    365   $   365  100% 
New York Red Bull Arena 2010  $    190   $     90  47% 
Philadelphia PPL Park 2010  $    120   $     77  64% 
Salt Lake Rio Tinto Stadium 2008  $    115   $     16  14% 
Colorado Dick's Sporting Goods Park 2007  $    131   $     66  50% 
Toronto BMO Field 2007  $      63   $     63  100% 
Chicago Toyota Park 2006  $      98   $     98  100% 
Montreal Saputo Stadium 2006  $      14   $       0  0% 
Dallas Pizza Hut Park 2005  $      80   $     80  100% 
L.A. 
Galaxy/Chivas 
Home Depot Center 2003  $    150   $       0    0% 
New England Gillette Stadium 2002  $    325   $     33  10% 
Seattle Qwest Field 2002  $    300   $   201  67% 
Columbus Columbus Crew Stadium 1999  $      29   $       0  0% 
 17 of 18   $ 2,340   $1,249  53% 
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Table 4:  New NBA Arenas since 1990 
 
Team Stadium Built Cost (000s) 
(Nominal) 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Percent 
Orlando Amway Center 2010  $    480   $    430  90% 
Brooklyn Nets Barclays Center 2010  $    637   $    150  24% 
Charlotte Time Warner Cable Arena 2005  $    265   $    265  100% 
Memphis FedEx Forum 2004  $    250   $    250  100% 
Phoenix U.S. Air (construction and 
rehab.) 
1992/ 
2004 
 $    157   $    157  100% 
Houston Toyota Center 2003  $    235   $    192  82% 
San Antonio AT&T Center 2002  $    186   $    158  85% 
Oklahoma City Ford Center 2002  $      89   $      89  100% 
Dallas American Airlines Center 2001  $    420   $    210  50% 
Toronto Air Canada Centre 1999  $    265   $         -  0% 
Indianapolis Conseco Fieldhouse 1999  $    183   $    183  100% 
Atlanta Philips Arena 1999  $    214   $      63  29% 
Denver Pepsi Center 1999  $    160   $      35  22% 
Lakers/Clippers Staples Center 1999  $    375   $      59  16% 
New Orleans New Orleans Arena 1999  $    114   $    114  100% 
Miam American Airlines Arena 1998  $    213   $    213  100% 
Washington Verizon Center 1997  $    260   $      60  23% 
Golden State Oracle Arena (rehab) 1997  $    121   $    121  100% 
Philadelphia Wells Fargo Center 1996  $    206   $         -  0% 
Boston TD Garden 1995  $    160   $         -  0% 
Portland Rose Garden 1995  $    262   $      35  13% 
Seattle Key Arena (rehab) 1995  $      75   $      75  100% 
Cleveland Quicken Loans Arena 1994  $    152   $    152  100% 
Chicago United Center 1994  $    175   $         -  0% 
New York Madison Square Garden 
(rehab) 
1991  $    200   $         -  0% 
Salt Lake City EnergySolutions Arena 1991  $      93   $         -  0% 
Memphis Memphis Pyramid 1991  $      65   $      65  100% 
Minneapolis Target Center 1990  $    104   $      52  50% 
 27 out of 30   $ 6,115   $ 3,126  51% 
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Table 5: New NHL Arenas since 1990 
 
Team Stadium Built Cost (000s)  
(Nominal) 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Percent 
Pittsburgh Consol Energy Center 2010  $     321   $     130  40% 
New Jersey Prudential Center 2008  $     375   $     210  56% 
Phoenix Jobing.com Arena 2003  $     180   $     180  100% 
Dallas American Airlines Center 2001  $     420   $     210  50% 
Columbus Nationwide Arena 2000  $     175   $          -  0% 
Minnesota Xcel Energy Center 2000  $     130   $     130  100% 
Toronto Air Canada Centre 1999  $     265   $          -  0% 
Atlanta Philips Arena 1999  $     214   $       63  29% 
Denver Pepsi Center 1999  $     160   $       35  22% 
Los Angeles Staples Center 1999  $     375   $       59  16% 
Carolina RBC Center 1999  $     158   $       98  62% 
Ft. Lauderdale BankAtlantic Center 1998  $     212   $     185  87% 
Washington  Verizon Center 1997  $     260   $       60  23% 
Nashville Bridgestone Arena 1997  $     144   $     144  100% 
Philadelphia Wells Fargo Center 1996  $     206   $          -  0% 
Ottawa Scotiabank Place 1996  $     188   $         6  3% 
Buffalo HSBC Arena 1996  $     128   $       55  43% 
Tampa Bay St. Pete Times Forum 1996  $     160   $     120  75% 
Montreal Le Center Bell 1996  $     230   $          -  0% 
Vancouver Rogers Arena 1996  $     160   $          -  0% 
Boston TD Garden 1995  $     160   $          -  0% 
Chicago United Center 1994  $     175   $          -  0% 
St. Louis Scottrade Center 1994  $     170   $       35  20% 
Anaheim Honda Center 1993  $     123   $     123  100% 
San Jose HP Pavillion 1993  $     163   $     133  82% 
NY Rangers Madison Square Garden 
(rehab) 
1991  $     200   $          -  0% 
 26 out of 30   $  5,451   $  1,974  36% 
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Table 6: Examples of Mega-Event ex ante Economic Impact Studies 
 
Event Year Sport Impact Source 
Super Bowl (Miami) 1999 Football $393 million 
Sports Management 
Research Institute, NFL 
(1999) 
Super Bowl (San 
Diego) 
2003 Football $367 million 
Marketing Information 
Masters, NFL (2003) 
Super Bowl (Arizona) 2008 Football $501 million 
W.P. Carey Business School 
(2008) 
MLB All-Star Game 1999 Baseball $75 million Selig, et al. (1999) 
MLB World Series 2000 Baseball $250 million 
Comptroller of New York 
City, Ackman (2000) 
NCAA Men‟s Final 
Four (St. Louis) 
2001 Basketball $110 million 
St. Louis Convention and 
Visitor‟s Bureau, Anderson 
(2001) 
U.S. Open 2001 Tennis $420 million 
Sports Management 
Research Institute, U.S. 
Tennis Assoc. (2002) 
World Cup (Japan) 2002 Soccer $24.8 billion 
Dentsu Institute for Human 
Studies, Finer (2002) 
World Cup (South 
Korea) 
2002 Soccer $8.9 billion 
Dentsu Institute for Human 
Studies, Finer (2002) 
World Cup 2010 Soccer $12 billion 
Grant Thornton South 
Africa, Voigt (2010) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Multiple 
$5.1 billion 
77,000 jobs 
Humphreys and Plummer 
(2005) 
Winter Olympics 
(Vancouver, BC) 
2010 Multiple 
$10.7C billion 
244,000 jobs 
InterVISTAS Consulting 
(2002) 
 
Source:  Matheson (2011) 
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Table 7: Examples of Mega-Event ex post Economic Impact Studies 
Event Years Variable Impact Source 
MLB All-Star Game 1973-1997 Employment down 0.38% 
Baade and Matheson 
(2001) 
Super Bowl 1973-1999 Employment 537 jobs 
Baade and Matheson 
(2000a) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Employment 293,000 jobs 
Hotchkiss, et al. 
(2003) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Employment 
3,500 - 42,000 
jobs 
Baade and Matheson 
(2002) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Employment Approx. 75,000 
Feddersen and 
Maennig (2009) 
World Cup 2006 Employment 
Not statistically 
significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
Super Bowl 1970-2001 Personal Income $91.9 million 
Baade and Matheson 
(2006a) 
MLB playoffs and 
World Series 
1972-2000 Personal Income 
$6.8 
million/game 
Baade and Matheson 
(2008) 
NCAA Men‟s BB 
Final Four 
1970-1999 Personal Income 
down $44.2-$6.4 
million 
Baade and Matheson 
(2004a) 
World Cup 1994 Personal Income down $4 billion 
Baade and Matheson 
(2004b) 
World Cup 2006 Personal Income 
Not statistically 
significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
Multiple Events 1969-1997 
Personal 
Income/capita 
Not statistically 
significant 
Coates and 
Humphreys (2002) 
Daytona 500 1997-1999 Taxable Sales $32 - $49 million 
Baade and Matheson 
(2000b) 
Super Bowl 1985-1995 Taxable Sales no effect Porter (1999) 
Multiple Events 
(Florida) 
1980-2005 Taxable Sales 
down $34.4 
million (avg.) 
Baade, Bauamann, 
Matheson (2008) 
Multiple Events 
(Texas) 
1991-2005 Gross Sales 
Varied - pos. and 
neg. 
Coates (2006) 
Multiple Events 
(Texas) 
1990-2006 
Sales Tax 
Revenue 
Varied - pos. and 
neg. 
Coates and Depken, 
(2009) 
NFL Pro-Bowl 2004-2008 Tourist arrivals 6,726 visitors 
Baumann, Matheson, 
and Muroi (2009) 
NHL regular season 
games 
1990-1999 
Hotel 
Occupancy 
Slight increase 
Lavoie and Rodriguez 
(2005) 
 
Source:  Matheson (2011) 
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Table 8: Sources of Public Funds for NFL Stadium Construction, 1992-2006 
 
 
Year 
Built 
Public 
Contribution 
Referendum Public funding source 
Atlanta 1992 100% No 2.75% Hotel tax 
Jacksonville 1995 100% No 
Sales tax, hotel tax, ticket charge, 
general funds 
St. Louis 1995 100% No 
2.5% hotel tax, general funds 
($257 mil.) 
Carolina 1996 21% No Personal Seat License (PSL) 
Oakland 1996 100% No PSL 
Washington 1997 28% No  
Baltimore 1998 80% No Lottery 
Tampa Bay 1998 100% Yes 0.5% sales tax 
Buffalo 1999 100% No General funds 
Cleveland 1999 90% Yes 
Hotel tax, car rental tax, sin taxes, 
PSL 
Tennessee 1999 76% Yes Hotel tax, PSL ($72 mil.) 
Cincinnati 2000 200% Yes 
0.5% sales tax, ticket charge, PSL 
($25 mil.) 
Denver 2001 75% Yes Sales tax 
Pittsburgh 2001 65% No 
Ticket charge ($14 mil.), PSL 
($42 mil.), other 
Detroit 2002 73% Yes 1% hotel tax, $2 car rental tax 
Houston 2002 75% Yes 
Hotel tax, car rental tax, ticket 
charge, sin taxes, PSL 
New England 2002 10% No  
Seattle 2002 67% Yes 
Sales tax, 2% hotel tax, 10% 
ticket charge, lottery, PSL ($17 
mil.) 
Chicago 2003 75% No 2% hotel tax, PSL ($60 mil.) 
Green Bay 2003 85% Yes 
0.5% sales tax, ticket charge 
($92.5 mil.) 
Philadelphia 2003 80% No  
Arizona 2006 72% Yes 1% hotel tax, $3.50 car rental tax 
 
Source:  Baade and Matheson (2006b)  
 
